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The problem that concerns me in this paper is a limitation on the idea 
of the autonomous self, and my aim, in resisting this, is not only to give 
careful attention to an otherness to ourselves, but also to reconsider the act 
of writing in the light of what Walter Benjamin understands as its mimetic 
aspect. For in writing, we find a way of capturing what otherwise escapes 
us. It begins by explaining Benjamin s concern with the form of language 
in relation to 'the mimetic faculty of human being '. Second, with regard 
to this mimetic faculty 'the correspondences', in which human beings can 
touch the mystic aspects of the world is considered. Third, in order to think 
about the mimetic aspect of writing, Benjamin s essay on Franz Kafka 
is examined. In conclusion, I suggest a way in which we can understand 
writing in terms of its ethical conduct. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
89 
When we think about writing about ourselves, e.g., in autobiography, it is taken to 
be a matter of simply writing about someone who is presumed to be continuous, to 
remain the same, through past, present and future. Thus, it is assumed, through writing 
we can develop our autonomy. In this way, the modem self has engaged in an endless 
process of objectification of the self through a reinforcement of self-consciousness and 
avoiding the strangeness. To be an autonomous self is crucial for enjoying personal 
liberty in societies; hence, it is also crucial for educational practice. An autonomous 
self can make decisions or choices that secure the best conditions for itself. From 
this perspective, others can be understood as the same as us; they can enjoy their 
liberty and being subjects of their own decisions and choices; thus they owe us their 
responsibilities as well. This is one of our starting points for thinking education in own 
society-that is to say, our presumption that we can understand others who can share 
the same conditions of meaning. Here I want to emphasise that point: seeing others to 
be the same as us means in a sense rejecting any otherness to ourselves in our ordinary 
lives. 
Paul Standish (2001) insightfully gives his attention to the otherness of ordinary 
things. In the context of ethics, which can be misunderstood when equality is 
emphasised, Standish shows the importance of our responsibility to response to 
otherness, which will inevitably be encountered in our lives. However, if we think 
about otherness to ourselves in terms of an emphasis on responsibility, there is, I 
believe, a danger of falling into a relation to others that is understood in terms of debt 
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and the performance of obligation. I want to shift the emphasis slightly in order to 
reconsider an otherness to ourselves in the light of its appearance in 'our' writing. 
The problem that concerns me in this paper is a limitation on the very idea of the 
modern subject, namely the autonomous self, and my aim, in resisting this, is not 
only to give careful attention to an otherness to ourselves that is excluded from the 
confinement of the modem self or the progressive view of history, but also to reconsider 
the act of writing in the light of what Walter Benjamin (1892-1940) understands as 
its mimetic aspect. In this paper I would like to pursue another way of writing. For in 
writing, we find a way of capturing what otherwise escapes us: we attentively mimic 
what we cannot fully understand. 
This paper has three main sections. First, in order to understand Benjamin's concept 
of language, I shall examine his concern with the form of language in its relation to 
'the mimetic faculty of human beings'. Second, with regard to this mimetic faculty 'the 
correspondences' in which human beings can touch mystic aspects of the world will be 
considered. Third, in order to think about the mimetic aspect of the writer or of writing, 
Benjamin's essay on Franz Kafka will be considered, especially with regard to the 
concept of the gesture and the way that this can capture an otherness to ourselves. In 
conclusion, I shall say something about writing in terms of its ethical activity. 
II. LANGUAGE AS THE MIMETIC FACULTY OF HUMAN BEINGS 
In considering Benjamin's language theory 'On Language as Such and on the 
Language of Man (1916)' is the most influential text, which focuses a theological 
aspect of language l . In 1933 Benjamin developed a new language theory, provoked 
by the anthropological studies on primitive people or societies. In 'On the Mimetic 
Faculty' Benjamin shows us how the human mimetic gift (faculty) entered into writing 
and language. 
To understand his concept of language based on the mimetic faculty of human 
beings, it is worth considering Benjamin's differentiation between the 'sensuous 
similarity' and the 'nonsensuous similarity' of the mimetic faculty of human beings. 
The former is represented by onomatopoeia; the latter is represented by dance, cultic 
ritual and language. Benjamin gives careful attention to nonsensuous similarity. 
Nonsensuous similarities are produced, not through the same thing-for instance, 
the sound of the blowing wind and of voices-but by human body in its form or its 
movement. In relation to this point, Benjamin refers to the children's mimetic activities 
in playas an example for explaining a production of nonsensuous similarities. 
Benjamin points out: '[t]he child plays at being not only a shopkeeper or teacher, but 
also a windmill and a train' (Benjamin, 1933, p. 720). In other words, in play, the child 
becomes very similar to the object: it mimics in its own body. 
When Benjamin considers language in terms of this nonsensuous similarity, he 
thinks of the most ancient way of reading, which took place 'prior to all languages, 
from entrails, the stars, or dances' which enable us to read the mysteries of the 
world (p. 722).2 Benjamin's concept of language finds its position in this genealogy. 
Benjamin tries to understand some kind of pre-linguistic nature of language. In this 
sense, language itself might be understood a kind of mimesis of the strangeness, which 
tells us something-that is to say, revelation. 
When Benjamin emphasises the form of language (that is, the nature of written 
language itself) in terms of this nonsensuous similarity, there is no difference between 
form and content/meaning of language.3 With regard to this point it helps us to 
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understand the concept of experience that Benjamin tries to deal with here. According 
to Yasuo Imai, Benjamin tries to think about the irrational aspect of experience, which 
is excluded from the Kantian concept of experience (Imai, 2003). Susan A. Handelman 
(1991) also argues that Benj amin is interested in the mimetic faculty of human beings 
in relation to their pre-logical way of thinking. 
If we understand language in this way, producing similarity (here, we can understand 
this similarity in terms of language) is always the act of proceeding to read the meaning 
of the world. According to Benjamin, this mimetic faculty can be understood as the 
gift, in the dual sense of the faculty and of beings presented, of human beings that they 
can see similarity and produce it. The mimetic faculty of human beings shows us the 
nature of language, which is produced by the inevitability that the human beings can 
not help but see similarities (like playing child), and being similar to these, because 
human beings are bestowed with this gift. 
At this point, Benjamin raises the question of what use this mimetic faculty 
is to human beings. To think about this question we need to remember that; in 
Benjamin's sense, nonsensuous similarity is related to ritualistic ceremonies, which 
are indispensable for primitive people to understand the mysteries of the world and its 
relation to their lives, namely revelation. According to Benjamin's concept of language, 
based on the mimetic faculty of human beings, language might be understood in 
relation to this revelation and, in its form, show mysteries of the world-that is, an 
otherness to ourselves; with regard to this point such revelation cannot be separated 
between form and content. 
In order to understand the relation between the mimetic faculty of human beings 
and its production of the form-such as dance, cultic ritual and language, in which 
revelations can be read-in next section I will consider 'the correspondences', which 
relate to Benjamin's question. 
III. CORRESPONDENCES OF MYSTERIES 
According to Benjamin, the correspondences (which are produced by nature, are 
mimicked in the mimetic faculty of human beings, and can be read in these forms 
of nonsensuous similarities, such as dance, cultic ritual and language) show that the 
world can be understood in 'the law of similarity', which means that macrocosm 
corresponds with microcosm. With regard to this point, human beings cannot be 
understood apart from this law of similarity. According to Benjamin, this is the reason 
why the mimetic faculty is to human beings, and cultic ritual ensures human beings 
to share the meanings of mysteries of the world (revelation) which are given in the 
correspondences. In this faculty human beings can see their experience in relation to 
mysteries of the world, say, in similarities. Here we can understand the gift in another 
dual sense, we are bestowed with the gift to see and produce similarities which 
shows us mysteries of the world, and the world gives the correspondences in terms of 
revelation for us to stimulate our gift in order to show its mysteries in a flash of the 
moment. 
In a general sense, similarity is understood in terms of the notion of being the same. 
N onsensuous similarities, however, are produced not through the same thing as the 
object mimicked by the human beings, but in forms, such as language, that are different 
from such objects. When Benjamin thinks of language as one of the mimetic faculties 
of human beings in relation to the correspondences that are produced by nature, he 
understands revelation as what cannot be read by revealing the cover over the truths 
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(mysteries) but quite the reverse, namely veiling over the truths with similarities 
(language) that produced by the mimetic faculty of human beings. In other words, 
human beings need to veil over revelation with similarities produced by their mimetic 
faculty to read the mysteries of the world. With regard to this, we can understand 
language in terms of this veil over truths. 
Benjamin wishes to produce 'the world distorted in the state of resemblance', where 
the objects can be seen with mysteries for us who live in our ordinary world.4 In this 
sense language mimics the mysteries of the world by veiling over these mysteries with 
itself to produce the similarities of changing forms of truths. 5 Here it is crucial to 
understand the concept of truths in Benjamin's sense: truths can flash only when they 
are veiled once in a moment and vanished as soon as they appear. This is why truth 
cannot be expressed in a fixable way. 
Benjamin understands language as a kind of relic of the mimetic faculty of human 
beings after ritualistic ceremonies are ruined in this modem age. At this point we can 
see why Benjamin wants to think about the mimetic aspect of writing: it is because this 
mimetic aspect of writing can capture those mysteries of the world that can flash only 
in the act of writing. 6 
In order to understand the mimetic aspect of the writer or of writing, in the next 
section I would like to consider Benjamin's essay on Franz Kafka as an extreme case 
of a mimetic writer or mimetic works. 
IV. KAFKA'S GESTURE: WRITING AS ETHICAL ACTIVITY 
Benjamin quotes from Kafka's note in which Kafka says that what he has experienced 
is 'a seasickness on dry land. Each gives way and mingles with its opposite' (Benjamin, 
1934a, 126). However, 'Kafka does not tire of expressing himself on the fluctuating 
nature of experiences' (ibid.) Here let us understand that Benjamin tries to translate 
Kafka's experience of a seasickness on dry land into 'the world distorted in the state of 
resemblance', which enables us to touch the mysteries of world-that is to say, in this 
kind of experience an otherness to ourselves can appear. 
In Benjamin's understanding, nothing but gesture makes Kafka having an 
experience of a seasickness on dry land. Here let us understand this gesture in terms of 
nonsensuous similarities which is produced by the mimetic faculty of human beings. In 
the modem age we do not have the sphere of secure and divine ritual, in which people 
could share same meaning of the correspondence. Furthermore, according to Benjamin, 
'the magical correspondences' themselves hardly can be perceived by 'modem man'. 
In this sense an otherness to ourselves can be understood as such an irretrievable past. 
Handelman (1991) points out that Kafka is a writer who is aware of and struggle with 
the disconnection of tradition or the shock and rift of the modem life. Benjamin looks 
closely at Kafka's writings of gestures in his works, which are described in detail 
recurrently, and sees these works themselves as gestures that hide the mysteries of the 
world. In Benjamin's thought, Kafka's gestures show us, in his language, the way he 
struggles with what he cannot know. In this sense we can say that Kafka's writings 
gestures are a kind of mimicking of an otherness to himself that Kafka himself cannot 
understand its meaning. 
Thus, in this sense we can say that a mimic writer can capture an otherness to 
ourselves in the way of such gestures in terms of writing. Here let us raise this 
question: in what kind of attitude a mimic writer can do this. What in question here is 
an attitude toward others. In relation to this point, Axel Honneth claims the importance 
© 2009 The Author 
Writing and Experience 93 
of the writer's attitude 'in a state of reduced attention' to capture an otherness to ourselves, 
according to his understanding of Proust's 'involuntary memory', which is studied by 
Benjamin. For Benjamin, however, 'involuntary' does not mean reduced writer's attention. 
Benjamin writes: 'Even if Kafka did not pray ... , he possessed in the highest degree 
what Malebranche called 'the natural prayer of the soul': attentiveness' (Benjamin, 
1934a, p. 130). We have to be attentive to an otherness to ourselves in our mimetic 
faculty-that is, our writing especially in this modem. From this point of view, we can 
understand the act of mimetic writer in terms of an attentive response to an otherness 
to ourselves. Now let us consider Kafka's gestures in terms of following Giorgio 
Agamben's understanding: 
If dance is gesture, this is, however, because it is nothing but the physical tolerance of 
bodily movements and the display of their mediating nature. Gesture is the display of 
mediation, the making visible of a means as such. It makes apparent the human state 
of being-in-a-medium and thereby opens up the ethical dimension for human beings. 
(Agamben, 1978, p. 155) 
In Benjamin's thought, Kafka is the most extreme exemplar of the mimetic writer, 
because of his attentiveness toward what he cannot understand. 
V. CONCLUSION 
This paper has sought a way of writing 'our' experience in a different manner from 
the self-reinforcement that forces individuals to be autonomous self and to protect 
themselves against others. It has done this especially in relation to Walter Benjamin's 
concept of language, which is understood as in terms of the mimetic faculty of 
human beings. If we understand language as the mimetic faculty of human beings, 
language itself has its otherness to ourselves. In this sense, writing means to write not 
about ourselves but about something that we can in no way fully understand. Kafka 
reproduces the mysteries of the world by way of veiling over gestures that he himself 
cannot fully understand with his mimetic writing. Therefore, in a sense Kafka's works 
are bestowed as a gift with mysteries for us. 
This understanding of writing enables us to change the relation with others. In 
general, we tend to see others to be the same as us-that is, I and you both owe 
responsibility and a kind of debt to each other. Benjamin's concept of language, 
however, raises the question of how we can think of others if we start to think with 
the notion that others are completely different from us. The mimetic faculty enables 
human beings to be similar to others, objects and nature, but we cannot be the same: 
we must be different from them. On the one hand, we inevitably want to be similar to 
what is other to us like a playing child. On the other hand, we are bestowed mysteries 
of the world that stimulate our mimetic faculty, which now can be understood in 
terms of language. In this sense, the act of writing inevitably responds to an otherness 
to ourselves in the way free from the idea of debt or responsibility which, in a sense 
is just following or protected by the rule book, because such otherness to ourselves 
always and already is bestowed to us. In act of writing we can be aware that something 
is bestowed on us. At the same time, in the act of writing we ourselves cannot simply 
persist in the same way as before: it never can avoid transforming the existing self. In 
the act of writing, we can attentively respond to an otherness to ourselves: that is, our 
attentive response is ethical activity. 
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NOTES 
1. Here it is important for us to think about what Benjamin says: '[ w ]hat does language communicate? It communicates 
itself in language and not through language'. With regard this point he so concerns with the form of language. See 
also: Imai (2003). 
2. Benjamin claims that we need the future philosophy that can consider dregs in the bottom of coffee cup. I believe 
that this claim shows why Benjamin so concerns with language or irrational aspect of experience. 
3. Benjamin is resisting the language theories which see language as arbitrary and a limited combination of signs and 
contents. 
4. See: 'On the Image of Proust'. This point is also related with Benjamin'S concern with Mannerism, surrealism or 
comedy. 
5. See: 'The Task ofthe Translator'. 
6. Benjamin demonstrates: 'It may be supposed that the mimetic process which expresses itself in this way in the 
activity of the writer was, in the very distant times in which script originated, of utmost importance for writing' 
(Benjamin, 1933: 722). 
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